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Abstract:  Major changes have occurred in the structure of former centrally planned 
economies, including a sharp rise in the share of services in GDP, employment and 
international transactions. However, large differences exist across transition economies with 
respect to services intensity and services policy reforms. We find that reforms in policies 
towards financial and infrastructure services, including telecommunications, power and 
transport, are highly correlated with inward FDI. Controlling for regressors commonly used 
in the growth literature, we find that measures of services policy reform are statistically 
significant explanatory variables for the post-1990 economic performance of transition 
economies. These findings suggest services policies should be considered more generally in 
empirical analyses of economic growth. 
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Services Policy Reform and Economic Growth in Transition Economies, 1990-2004 
 
One of the stylized facts of economic development is that the share of services in GDP and 
employment rises as per capita incomes increase (Francois and Reinert, 1996). This reflects 
increasing specialization and exchange of services through the market (“outsourcing”)—with an 
associated increase in variety and quality that may raise productivity of firms and welfare of final 
consumers, in turn increasing demand for services. It also reflects the limited scope for (labor) 
productivity in provision of some services, implying that over time the (real) costs of these 
services will rise relative to merchandise, as will their share of employment (Baumol, 1967; 
Fuchs, 1968). Services are increasingly becoming tradable as a result of the greater mobility of 
people and technological change. This further increases the scope for specialization in 
production and trade. The competitiveness of firms—both domestic enterprises operating on the 
local market and exporters on international markets—depends importantly on the availability, 
cost and quality of producer services such as finance, transport, and telecommunications.  
Services industries were generally neglected under central planning. Marxist thinking 
emphasized the importance of tangible (material) inputs as determinants of economic 
development, and classified employment in the services sector as unproductive. The lack of 
producer services was reflected in transport bottlenecks, queuing for and low quality of 
telecommunications, the absence  of efficient financial intermediation, and much lower 
employment in services than was the case in OECD countries (e.g., less than 1 percent of the 
labor force was employed in finance and insurance) (Bicanic and Škreb, 1991). Many of the 
services that are critical to the functioning of a market economy simply did not exist—not just a 
financial sector that could allocate investment funds efficiently, but also design, advertising, 
packaging, distribution, logistics, management, after sales services, etc. 
In this paper we analyze the impact of service sector policy reforms on the growth 
performance of 24 transition economies. There are large differences in economic performance 
across these transition economies. Our primary objective is to explore to what extent services-
related policies help explain these differences. We start with a brief discussion of shifts in the 
structure of these economies and developments in trade and inward FDI in services (Section 1). 
We then summarize the prevailing policies towards trade and investment in services and the 
changes that have occurred since the early 1990s (Section 2), focusing in particular on so-called 
backbone service industries: finance, telecommunications and infrastructure (including utilities). 




for standard explanatory variables commonly used in the literature. We find that services policies 
are an important determinant of growth performance; the coefficient estimates on our reform 
indices are all statistically significant. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Shifts in the Structure of Services in Transition Economies 
The share of services in GDP and employment has grown significantly since 1990 in almost all 
transition economies. Compared to the high income OECD average in 1990—when the share of 
services in employment and GDP was around 63 percent—countries in Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA) lagged far behind: services accounted for 30-40 percent of GDP and employment. As of 
2003, services shares had increased substantially. The greatest growth is observed in the Baltic 
States, which have almost converged on the OECD average of 68 percent in terms of GDP 
shares, although employment shares remain lower (Figure 1). The Central and Eastern  European 
(CEE) countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 have also converged to a large extent. Much less 
progress has been made by the Central Asian countries, where natural resource-based activities 
continue to constitute a major share of GDP.
1 
 
Figure 1: Changes in the Share of Services in GDP and Employment 
Share of Services Sector in GDP by Country 



















     
Employment Share of Service Sector by Country 




















  Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
  Note: CEE = Central and eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia); 
SEE = Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYRR Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and 
Montenegro; FSU1= Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; FSU2=Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova; FSU3 = Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia; FSU4 = Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. 
 
There is also a distinct pattern in labor productivity performance. The CEE, South-East 
European (SEE) and Baltic states register an increase in productivity, both overall and within 
services (broadly defined to include government).
2 Conversely, for those other countries where 
                                                                   
1 See Figure 1 for the definition of country groups used in this paper. 
2 Output data is measured in constant 1995 US dollars, as reported in the World Development Indicators.   
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data is available, there has been a decline in the measured value of services output per employee. 
These countries also have not increased their overall labor productivity performance in the last 
decade. Noteworthy is the performance of the Baltic countries, where labor productivity in 
services outpaced the productivity increase in other sectors of the economy. Convergence with 
respect to high-income OECD countries in terms of productivity levels is still far from being 
achieved, however.  
 
Figure 2: Labor productivity                                                        
Labor Productivity of Service Sector by Country 

























                
Labor Productivity of All Sectors by Country 


























                                                                                           
Note: For definition of country groups, see Figure 1. 
 
Input-output tables for the year 2001, the latest available year for many ECA countries, 
provide information on differences in economic structure and the extent to which ECA countries 
have converged to comparators in the rest of world as regards both intermediate services use and 
final demand, as well as on the service intensity of exports. Table 1 reports information on the 
sectoral intensity of exports: the direct contribution of agriculture, mining, manufactures and 
services to total exports, expressed as a share of total exports of goods and services. Albania, 
Croatia and the Baltic States are the most services-intensive in exports. The first column in Table 
2 reports the sum of the direct  and indirect linkage effects generated by a unit of export 
revenue—the total activity generated by (going into) one unit of foreign exchange (exports). The 
average “multiplier” is 3.6, i.e., every US$ of exports generates $3.6 in economic activity. On 
average a little over one third of this total activity is services-related, ranging from a high of 52 
percent (Albania) to a low of 27 percent (Czech Republic). Many transition countries are more 







Table 1: Sectoral Share of Total Export Revenue, selected transition economies) 
  Agriculture/Food/ Mining  Manufactures  Services 
Albania  19  35  46 
Croatia  9  49  42 
Czech Rep.  5  80  15 
Hungary  7  76  17 
Poland  10  73  17 
Romania  4  85  10 
Slovakia  4  86  10 
Slovenia  4  81  15 
Estonia  11  66  22 
Latvia  13  64  24 
Lithuania  13  63  24 
Russia  40  52  8 
Source: GTAP Input-Output data derived from SAMs for 2001. 
 
Table 2:  Total Export Related Activity (direct plus indirect linkages), 2001 
Shares    Total 
“Multiplier”  Agriculture/Food  Mining  Manufactures  Services 
Albania  4.8  20  4  24  52 
Croatia  2.9  18  1  36  45 
Czech Rep.  3.0  10  2  61  27 
Hungary  2.8  10  2  51  37 
Poland  4.2  17  3  43  38 
Romania  6.6  27  3  39  30 
Slovakia  2.9  12  3  57  28 
Slovenia  2.9  10  1  58  31 
Estonia  2.5  15  2  49  35 
Latvia  3.0  17  1  36  47 
Lithuania  3.5  17  4  36  42 
Russia  3.6  14  17  30  39 
Memo: 
         
Cyprus  2.5  10  7  30  52 
Turkey  3.7  17  2  40  41 
China  3.7  18  3  62  17 
Malaysia  2.1  8  3  64  25 
Germany  3.3  7  1  49  43 
Source: GTAP Input-Output data derived from Social Accounting Matrices for 2001. 
 
Although technology is making it easier to trade services, often a commercial presence 
remains required to sell services, i.e., FDI. Given the lack of a service sector under central 
planning, FDI can be expected to play a particularly important role, more so than in countries 
where incumbent competition confronts foreign providers. Overall, services account for some 62 
percent of the stock of FDI in the reporting countries (Table 3).3 Finance, transport, 
communications and distribution services account for the largest share of this FDI. The service 
intensity of FDI in services is highest in the Baltic states, presumably reflecting their relatively 
small size and limited manufacturing base, and lowest in Romania and the Ukraine. Services FDI 
                                                                   
3 Aggregate data on FDI inflows are available for a wider set of countries, but these are not broken down across 
services sectors.   
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is also very high as a ratio of GDP in the Baltic States. It is lowest in Romania, Russia and the 
Ukraine. 
 
Table 3: Inward FDI stock by sector, (end 2003 unless indicated otherwise; shares in total (%)) 
  CZ  HU  PL  SK  SI  EE  LV  LT  BG  CR  RO  RU  UK 
Sector  2002  2002  2002    2002             
flow 
00-02  2002 
                           
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  0.1  1.3  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.4  1.5  0.8  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.4  2.1 
Mining and quarrying  1.4  0.3  0.3  0.8  0.0  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.1  3.1      2.4 
Manufacturing  35.5  45.8  35.8  37.5  43.3  18.2  15.5  31.1  33.4  30.6  54.3  45**  46.4 
Electricity, gas, water supply  6.9  4.6  2.6  11.7  1.0  2.4  3.4  4.4  1.0  1.1      1.6 
Construction  1.9  1.1  2.6  0.7  0.1  2.5  1.0  1.2  2.7  0.9  2.4  2.2  2.9 
Distribution and repair services  11.9  11.1  17.1  11.2  14.5  15.9  18.0  17.9  18.0  6.9  16.4  22***  18.5 
Hotels and restaurants  1.2  1.1  0.6  0.5  0.4  1.7  1.3  1.6  1.7  4.0  2.4    2.3 
Transport, storage & comm.  13.6  10.1  10.4  10.0  4.4  17.7  11.9  17.1  15.7  25.0  7.8  9.5  7.2 
Financial intermediation  15.9  10.3  21.3  23.5  18.8  28.1  15.0  15.7  17.7  24.6    1.8  8.1 
Real estate, rental & business act.  9.3  11.7  7.5  3.2  15.2  11.4  24.5  7.3  3.9  3.1    8.2  4.7 
Education, health, social work  0.2  .  .  0.4.  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2.  0.3  0.0.      2.3 
Other community& personal ser.  2.4  .  .  0.3  0.5  0.8  1.1  1.5  0.8  0.5    0.2  1.5 
Other not classified activities  0.0  1.0  1.4  .  1.7  0.4  6.0  0.3  3.2  ..  16*  11.0   
Real estate purchases by foreigners  .  1.5  .  .  .  .  .  .    ..       
                           
Total services share ****  56.2  47.9  60.9  49.8  55.7  78.6  78.9  62.8  65.2  64.9  45  54.6  47.5 
Value of services FDI stock ($ bn)  26.7  22.9  36.8  5.6  2.8  5.1  2.6  3.1  3.3  7.4  5.7  35.5  3.6 
Services FDI stock as % of GDP  31.6  27.7  17.6  17.6  7.7  60.7  26.8  37.8  16.6  26.1  9.4  8.2  7.3 
Notes: NMS: New EU Member States;  * Includes finance and business services. ** Covers all industry, including 
mining/energy;  *** Includes hotels and restaurants; **** Not including utilities. 
Source: wiiw-wifo Database on FDI, July 2004 edition. 
 
The forgoing snapshot of trends in the share of services in GDP, employment, output per 
worker, trade and FDI reveal both substantial convergence towards European countries, but also 
a distinct difference between Central European/Baltic states and Central Asian and CIS 
economies. Given that trade and FDI in services can be expected to be associated with the 
acquisition of new technologies, higher service standards and more effective delivery, these 
differences should help explain the observed higher labor productivity performance in services in 
the former. The question explored in the rest of this paper is whether these services 
developments are determinants of the aggregate growth performance of countries. The services 
outcome variables are of course endogenous, influenced by the policy stances of governments, so 
that the focus is on the impact of services policy reforms. 
 
2. Policy Stances and Service Sector Reforms 
Service sector reform involves a mix of deregulation (the dismantlement of barriers to entry and 




environment, strengthening regulatory agencies, increasing their independence, etc.). The policy 
challenge is to achieve a balance between effective regulation and increasing the contestability of 
markets. Much has been done by transition countries to reform and adapt policies and regulatory 
regimes for service industries. Figure 3 plots three indicators of the extent of policy reform in 
banking, non-bank financial services and infrastructure. These indices, constructed by the 
EBRD, range from 0 to 4.3, and span the period 1990-2004.
4 The value of the indices is set at 
zero for 1989, so that the 2004 value provides a measure of the progress that has been made by 
countries in converging to “best practice” standards—measured by a maximum value of 4.3. 
Data are available annually for the 1990-2004 period. 
 
 
























             Source: EBRD (2004). See Figure 1 for definition of country groups. 
 
Central and East European (CEE) and Baltic states (FSU1) have made the most progress 
in all three services policy areas. For the other transition countries there is significant variation 
across indices. SEE has advanced the most on reforms in banking and infrastructure, followed by 
the Caucasus (FSU3), while European CIS countries (FSU2) have done the most in the non-bank 
financial area, followed by SEE. The Central Asian republics have made the least progress in all 
three areas, with one country—Turkmenistan—not advancing at all in any. What follows briefly 
discusses current policies for financial and infrastructure services.
5 
                                                                   
4 See Annex 1 for more detailed information on the construction of the EBRD reform indices. 
5 What follows draws on a more detailed discussion in Eschenbach and Hoekman (2005).  
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Financial Services 
In CEE and Baltic countries the banking sector is presently characterized by small shares of 
credit allocated through state-owned banks and high foreign participation. Although weaknesses 
remain in the legal framework (e.g., creditor rights, the bankruptcy code), central bank 
independence has been strengthened in most of these countries. Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti 
(2001) develop a measure of independence that has 16 (weighted) components. They conclude 
that in CEE and Baltic countries the degree of independence has converged to that of the German 
Bundesbank in the 1980s. Most other transition countries fall substantially short of this. Their 
measure reflects only legal, not actual independence. If the latter is taken into account, the 
divergence across countries increases further. The Central Bank of Belarus, for instance, has a 
high degree of legal, but a low degree of actual independence. 
Banking markets in many FSU countries tend to be relatively closed in either a formal or 
informal (de facto) sense. However, there is significant variation across countries. Thus, 
Armenia’s financial sector is relatively open and scores higher in terms of regulation. Formal 
limits on foreign participation (globally or on an individual bank basis) play a role in some 
countries, but bureaucratic impediments are more prominent in inhibiting foreign participation. 
Examples include limitations on foreign staff, lengthy licensing procedures, financial repression, 
public ownership of major banks, and lax regulatory practices. In general the banking sector in 
these countries suffers from a weak capital base.  
Infrastructure Services 
Policy reforms in the area of utility and infrastructure services include better regulation of the 
provision of these services, removal of cross-subsidization, more efficient pricing, improved 
revenue collection, and separation/unbundling of activities. Three types of reforms are 
particularly important in increasing the efficiency of provision of regulated infrastructure 
services: (i) allowing entry of new domestic and foreign providers; (ii), where feasible, opening 
the domestic market to imports of such services; and (iii) the establishment of an independent 
regulator. The latter is likely to be a key determinant of regulatory effectiveness. Reforms may 
and often do include privatization, but this variable is captured in the overall investment climate 
variable, not in the infrastructure services policy reform index. Even if incumbent providers 
remain state-owned, if regulators permit entry of new providers in the market, such competition 




the CEE and Baltic countries have made the most progress in establishing independent 
regulators, while many of the CIS countries have made the least.  
Figure 4 disaggregates the infrastructure index along five sectoral dimensions—electric 
power, roads, railways, telecommunications, and water and wastewater—and assesses the 
cumulative reform progress in each of the ECA countries. On average for the region, progress 
has been most pronounced in the sectors of telecommunications and electrical power. Often this 
will reflect a mix of commercialization, deregulation and privatization of national telecom 
companies. The index shows little or no progress in utility and infrastructure reform in 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with most progress made in 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Romania. 
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Source: EBRD (2004). The scale ranges from 0 to 20, representing the cumulative progress for each country on the 
five indicators, which individually range from 1 to 4.3—see Annex 1. 
 
In the telecommunications sector, fixed-line services are still quite underdeveloped in 
most economies. This has given rise to faster growth of, and stronger competition in, the mobile 
services sectors, especially in CEE and Baltic countries, followed by SEE. In the rest of the FSU, 
mobile penetration rates fall short of fixed line services. In many of the latter countries, 
independent telecom regulators have yet to be established. The incumbent fixed-line operator 
may oppose interconnection agreements; tariffs are frequently low and distorted, and cross-
subsidies between different types of calls and customers continue to be prevalent. The least 
progress has been made in the rail, road and water sectors. Only some CEE countries, (e.g., 
Poland, Hungary, and Croatia) have introduced private sector participation through toll roads. 
Reforms in the railway sector are also at an early stage in terms of private sector participation,  
  10 
although the separation of infrastructure from operations is either planned or has been put in 
practice in many countries.
6  
FDI is an important channel for foreign providers to contest infrastructure service 
markets. FDI in these sectors sometimes takes the form of greenfield investment, but has mostly 
occurred through privatization. The extent of privatization varies substantially by country and 
sector, with Central European and Baltic countries the leaders in attracting FDI in infrastructure. 
The SEE countries have attracted the least.  
 
3.  Services Reforms and Growth Performance 
The foregoing review reveals significant progress but also substantial cross-country 
heterogeneity in terms of liberalization and reforms in the regulatory framework for key 
“backbone” services. To what extent does this help explain the significant differences in 
observed changes in services intensity of economies described in Section 1? Policy reforms 
should matter for domestic private investment and FDI in services. This is confirmed by simple 
regressions relating investment climate and the combined service sector reform variables to the 
stock of FDI as a share of GDP.
7 This generates coefficient estimates that are statistically 
significant. The fit of the regressions as reflected in the R
2 is high for both measures of policy 
(Annex Table 2 reports pair-wise correlation coefficients). The higher R
2 for model (1) relative 
to model (2) suggests that services-related policies play an important role in attracting FDI (and 
more generally, by extension, investment and growth performance). What follows investigates 
whether FDI (which is often heavily concentrated in services—see Section 2 above) and policy 
reforms are associated with better overall economic performance (growth). The focus is 
explicitly on the impacts of the policies towards “producer services” discussed previously.   
Standard economic growth theory postulates that growth is a function of capital and labor 
inputs. It accords no special role to services.  Services play a more prominent role in the 
literature on financial sector development (see Levine, 1997 for a survey), which recognizes that  
financial intermediaries do not simply passively convert savings into physical investment. 
                                                                   
6 In terms of actual reform measures a few examples are worth mentioning. Estonia, for instance, has fully 
privatized its railway system. Network maintenance is carried out privately in Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, 
and Kazakhstan. Passenger services are not profitable in many transition economies and are in general subsidized. In 
the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Romania the operation of some passenger services has been handed over to private 
companies. In Russia, Kazakhstan, Poland, and Romania private rail freight services have developed following 
gradual liberalization in this area. See Eschenbach and Hoekman (2005). 
7 As discussed in Annex 1, the investment climate reform variable measures progress in terms of privatization, price 




Instead, temporary or permanent growth effects of capital accumulation and productivity 
improvement are supported by financial intermediaries (banks, capital markets) that actively 
mobilize savings and channel these towards profit-maximizing investment opportunities. 
Another strand of the growth literature that (implicitly) emphasizes a services dimension stresses 
the importance of human capital (education) and R&D (a “service” activity) in generating 
(endogenous) growth (e.g., Lucas, 1988, Romer, 1990).   
 
Table 4: Reduced form panel estimates of FDI stocks regressed on policy reform variables 
Estimation technique  OLS fixed effects  OLS fixed effects 
Dependent variable  FDI/GDP  FDI/GDP 
Model No.  (1)  (2) 
Independent variables     
     
(a) Service reform index   18.92   
  (20.39)***   
     
(b) Investment climate index    17.13 
     (15.04)*** 
     
R
2  0.61  0.46 
     
No. of obs.  203  203 
Note: t-values in brackets, asterisks denote significance at 10*,5**, and 1*** percent levels. Sample includes 17 
transition economies.  See Annex for definition of variables. 
 
The role of producer-services of the type captured by the infrastructure services reform 
index in the growth process has not attracted much attention in the theoretical or empirical 
growth literature. Francois (1990) develops a model that points to the importance of such 
producer services for economic growth, although his model is not dynamic. He argues that the 
increasing importance of producer services in modern (growing) economies reflects economies 
of scale and specialization. As firm size increases and labor specializes, more activity needs to be 
devoted to coordinating and organizing the core businesses of a company. This additional 
activity is partly outsourced to external service providers. The associated organizational 
innovations and expansion of “logistics” (network) services yields productivity gains that in turn 
should affect economy-wide growth performance by enhancing the efficiency of production in 
all sectors. The associated cost reductions can have the effect of upgrading overall productivity,  
and are likely to be enhanced by, if not conditional on, increased FDI in services (Konan and 
Maskus, 2004; Markusen et al., 2005).
8  
                                                                   
8 Most of the quantitative analyses of the impact of services policy reforms has used static applied general 
equilibrium models. These find that services policies are important for welfare—e.g., Konan and Maskus (2004).  
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Table 5: Per-capita GDP growth and service sector policies in a panel of 24 transition economies 
Estimation technique  OLS fixed effects  Two-stage least squares fixed effects 
Dependent variable  Per-capita GDP growth  Per-capita GDP growth 
Model No.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Independent variables                         
                         
                         
(a) Investment/GDP  0.67            0.17           
  (0.74)            (1.10)           
(b) ?Investment/GDP    0.56  0.39  0.44  0.28  0.32    1.49  0.79  0.65  0.70  0.72 
    (5.97)***  (4.73)***   (2.45)**   (3.80)***  (4.21)***     (5.62)***    (3.57)***  (2.05)**   (3.58)***   (3.56)*** 
(c) Inflation      -0.002  -0.006  -0.0011  -0.0012       -0.002  -.006  -.001   -.001  
      (-4.50)***  (-5.36)***  -2.68***  (-3.06)***      -(4.09)***   (-4.87)***   (-2.19)**   (-2.77)*** 
(d) Crisis      -16.36   -1.77  -12.1  -13.23       -15.15  -1.67   -11.27   -12.6 
      (-8.29)***   (-0.59)  (-6.90)***  (-7.36)***      (-6.32)***  ( -0.55)  (-5.20)***  (-5.72)*** 
(e) FDI/GDP        0.22             0.21     
        (5.61)***             (5.07)***      
(f) Finance          8.29             8.47   
          (10.26)***            (8.38)***   
(g) Infrastructure            6.8            6.24 
            (8.81)***            (7.11)*** 
                         
Instruments              lags (1,2) of   lags (1,2) of   lags (1,2) of   lags (1,2) of   lags (1,2) of   lags (1,2) of  
              variable (a),  variable (a),  variable (a),  variable (a),  variable (a),  variable (a), 
              service,  service,  service,  service,  service,  service, 
              invclim  invclim   invclim plus  invclim plus  invclim plus  invclim plus 
                  exogenous  exogenous  exogenous  exogenous 
                  variables =  variables =  variables =  variables = 
                  (c), (d)  (c), (d), (e)  (c), (d), (f)  (c), (d), (g) 
                         
R-squared  0.01  0.09  0.29  0.26  0.37  0.37  0.01  0.04  0.24  0.25  0.32  0.33 
                         
No. of obs.  348  332  329  198  329  329  309  310  309  194  309  309 
Note: t-values in brackets, asterisks denote significance at 10*,5**, and 1*** percent levels. Model 4 = 17 countries only. Variables ‘service’ and ‘invclim’ are the average services 




In what follows we explore the impact of financial and infrastructure services policy 
reforms on growth using time-series data for a panel of 24 transition economies covering the 
1990-2004 period. Annex Tables 2, 3, and 4 describe the data and the sample, and provide 
descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation coefficients. We exclude three countries for which 
the coverage of macroeconomic data over time is poor (Turkmenistan, Serbia/Montenegro, 
Bosnia/Herzegovina). We start with simple OLS country fixed effects regressions
9 (Table 5). 
The dependant variable is the growth rate of per-capita GDP. In most of the literature, the main 
factor driving growth is assumed to be investment (e.g., Levine and Renelt, 1992). Transition 
economies experienced large swings in investment in the first half of the 1990s, with the collapse 
of central planning and the initial lack of market institutions leading to sharp reductions i n 
investment (Roland, 2000; Falcetti et al, 2002). Subsequently, a gradual buildup of a 
domestically and externally financed private capital stock occurred. This well-known U-shaped 
pattern of output and investment collapse and recovery suggests that the  change in the 
investment ratio be used as an alternative to the investment-GDP ratio as a measure of 
investment.
10  
The reduced form models (1) and (2) test the alternative hypotheses of a linear vs. non-
linear relationship between investment and growth. Investment/GDP is statistically insignificant 
(model 1), while the change in the ratio is significant. Thus, the initial collapse and the 
subsequent recovery in GDP growth was associated with changes in the rate of change in 
investment at a fast pace: first falling and subsequently rapidly growing investment ratios. We 
therefore use the change in investment in the regressions. In model (3) we add variables to 
account for crises and inflation. Inflation, a measure of macroeconomic stability, is expected to 
have a negative impact on growth. Crisis is a dummy variable that equals one in years when 
countries experienced armed conflict or a major financial crisis. It captures conflicts affecting 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan and the financial crises i n Russia and Albania. 
These events will be captured in part by other variables, but not completely, and we want to 
                                                                   
9 The fixed effects model allows to some extent for heterogeneity across countries. 
10 In the empirical analysis we do not use several variables that are often used in growth regressions. These include  
measures of human capital, trade openness and initial per-capita income. The reason is that our country sample is 
quite specific in the sense that all experienced a sharp fall in output in the first half of the 1990s, notwithstanding 
relatively high levels of human capital. Also, trade volumes during the early transition do not reflect integration with 
world markets but rather traditional COMECON barter trade relations. As a result of these factors, conditional 
convergence is not observed in the data, and including these variables yields rather counterproductive results.  
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control for them explicitly in any event. Both variables have the predicted sign and are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
In model (4) we include the stock of FDI as a share of GDP to the explanatory variables. 
Given limited time series data on FDI, this shrinks the sample to 17 countries. Due to the smaller 
sample size in model (4) the crisis variable is no longer significant. The result suggests FDI is an 
important factor driving growth. Ceteris paribus, the coefficient estimate indicates that a one-
percentage point increase in the FDI/GDP ratio is associated with a 0.22 percentage point 
increase in the growth rate.  
In models (5) and (6) we replace FDI with the annual EBRD reform indices, the premise 
being that service sector reform policy affects growth indirectly by supporting FDI inflows as 
well as domestic investment. The indices, summarized in Section 2 above, are constructed to 
reflect finance and infrastructure policy frameworks in a relatively broad sense (see Annex 1 and 
Annex Table 2 for details). Both indicators are significant at the one percent level. The 
coefficients suggest, ceteris paribus, that a one point increase in the reform index (scaled from 
no reform=1 to 4.3) is associated with an increase in the per-capita growth rate of 6.8 
(Infrastructure) and 8.3 (Finance) percentage points. Given the huge differentials in growth rates 
during the observed period this is not as large as it appears, but still amounts to a sizeable impact. 
The analysis of the model fit suggests that the reform indices add substantial explanatory power 
(the R
2 increases from 0.29 in model (3) to 0.37 in models (5) and (6) (model (4) is n ot directly 
comparable due to the smaller number of observations). 
The banking sector reform measure has a slightly larger effect in explaining observed 
growth than does the infrastructure policy reform variable. In those transition economies where 
financial intermediation existed during the 1990s, the output collapse was much less pronounced 
and the subsequent recovery occurred at a faster pace.
11 Strengthening the financial sector and 
bolstering confidence in the private commercial banking sector by improving the policy 
framework therefore is of great importance.
12 Indeed in many of the countries in question, 
potential depositors still shy away from banks and credit remains influenced by or subject to 
direct or indirect government control. As discussed above, the policy reform agenda in 
                                                                   
11 Campos and Coricelli (2002, p. 29ff) and Roland (2000) discuss the importance of missing and underdeveloped 
credit markets in the early transition period. 
12 This spans adoption of and compliance with good practice standards defined by organizations such as the IMF, 




infrastructure spans many dimensions, including pro-competitive regulation of public 
providers—tariffs that reflect costs and provide incentives for providers to pursue efficiency 
improvements, ensuring access to networks and  interconnection on reasonable terms, and the 
development of effective, independent regulatory bodies. 
  In models (7) to (14) we repeat the exercise using two-stage least squares regression so as 
to take into account the potential simultaneity bias in the r elationship between growth and 
investment. As instruments we use lags of the investment/GDP ratio and two composite EBRD 
reform indicators for the domestic investment climate and the service sector policy framework. 
Both lagged investment and policy indicators are sufficiently exogenous to growth but relate to 
current investment decisions and are therefore useful as instruments. The results are similar, with 
the coefficient estimate of the investment variable increasing slightly. 
   
4. Conclusions 
Controlling for a number of standard explanatory variables used in the growth literature 
(investment, crises, inflation), we find a statistically significant positive association between per-
capita GDP growth and indirect (FDI) and direct measures of service sector policy reforms (the 
different policy choice indices). Although the sample of countries was limited to transition 
economies—annual policy reform indicators of the type compiled by the EBRD do not exist for 
developing countries—the findings indicate that services policies should be considered more 
generally in empirical analyses of economic growth. Services such as finance, 
telecommunications and transport are major inputs into the production of goods and services—
including agriculture as well as manufacturing. The costs of these inputs can account for a major 
share of the total cost of production, and are thus important factors affecting the competitiveness 
of firms. Services are also important determinants of the productivity of workers in all sectors—
education, training, and health services are key “inputs” into the formation and maintenance of 
human capital. Thus, service sector reforms potentially can do much to enhance economic 
growth and efficiency.  
Both the policy and econometric evidence reviewed in t his paper suggests a 
comprehensive “behind-the-border” policy reform agenda focusing on services can help attract 
much-needed investment, both domestic and foreign. Openness to foreign competition—through 
policies that permit foreign participation on domestic markets—is a key element of good service  
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sector policy. There is no good measure available of the “multiplier” effect of services reform 
and openness. But the limited stock of inward FDI in Central Asian economies is in striking 
contrast to the CEE and Baltic countries. So is the overall economic performance of these 
different countries, measured both in terms of average performance and its volatility. 
Liberalization—greater participation by foreign service firms on domestic markets—is of course 
not sufficient. Given the characteristics of services and services markets—often affected by 
asymmetric information or high fixed costs and associated barriers to entry—there is also need 
for effective regulatory supervision of both domestic and foreign operators. This is a significant 
challenge. Given that the CEE, Baltic and increasingly the SEE countries now offer relatively 
attractive policy environments for FDI and have done much to converge on OECD regulatory 
standards in services, the policy reform threshold for the Central Asian and other transition 
countries has become much more competitive. The ongoing Doha Round negotiations—which 
span services—offer an immediate and important opportunity to pursue further service sector 
reforms and can help ensure that  the domestic policy efforts are made to put into place the 
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Annex 1: The EBRD Services Reform Indices  
The index ranges from 1(little progress) to 4.3 (most advanced implementation of reform agenda) and has 
been compiled on an annual basis for the 1990-2004 period. 
 
      1. Finance = average of the following two banking and non-banking reform indicators : 
§  Banking and interest rate liberalization: A 4.3 means full convergence of banking laws and  
               regulations with BIS standards, provision of full set of competitive banking services. 
§  Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions: 4.3 means full convergence of securities laws  
              and regulations with IOSCO standards, fully developed non-bank intermediation. 
 
  2.  Infrastructure = average of the following five infrastructure reform indicators: 
§  Electric power: 4.3 means Tariffs cost-reflective and provide adequate incentive for efficiency 
improvements. Large-scale private sector involvement in the unbundled and well-regulated sector. 
Fully liberalized sector with well-functioning arrangements for network access and full competition 
in generation. 
§  Railways: 4.3 means separation of infrastructure from operations and freight from passenger 
operations.  
Full divestment and transfer of asset ownership implemented or planned, including infrastructure and 
rolling stock. Rail regulator established and access pricing implemented. 
§  Roads: 4.3 means fully decentralized road administration. Commercialized road maintenance 
operations competitively awarded to private companies. Road user charges reflect the full costs of 
road use and associated factors, such as congestion, accidents and pollution. Widespread private 
sector participation in all aspects of road provision. Full public consultation on new road projects. 
§  Telecommunications: 4.3 means effective regulation through and independent entity. Coherent 
regulatory and institutional framework to deal with tariffs, interconnection rules, licensing, 
concession fees and spectrum allocation. Consumer ombudsman function. 
§  Water and waste water: 4.3 means water utilities fully decentralized and commercialized. Fully 
autonomous regulator exists with complete authority to review and enforce tariff levels and quality 
standards. Widespread private sector participation via service/management/lease contracts. High-
powered incentives, full concessions and/or divestiture of water and waste-water services in major 
urban areas. 
 
3.  Service = average of Infrastructure and Finance (used in Table 5 as an instrument) 
 
4. Invclim = Investment climate measure, the average six EBRD reform indicators: 
 
§   Large-scale privatization: 4.3 means standards and performance typical of advanced industrial 
economies: more than 75 per cent of enterprise assets in private ownership and significant progress 
on corporate governance of these enterprises 
§  Small-scale privatization: 4.3 means standards and performance typical of advanced industrial 
economies: no state ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land. 
§  Governance and enterprise restructuring: 4.3 means standards and performance typical of advanced 
industrial economies: effective corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions 
and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring. 
§  Price liberalization: 4.3 means standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: 
complete price liberalization with no price control outside housing, transport and natural monopolies. 
§  Trade and foreign exchange system:  4.3 means standards and performance typical of advanced 
industrial economies: removal of most tariff barriers; membership in WTO. 
§  Competition policy: 4.3 means standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: 
effective enforcement of competition; unrestricted entry to most markets. 
 




 Annex Table 1: Inward FDI Stock, US$ Million 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001  2002 2003 
Czech Republic  72 595 2,889 3,423 4,547 7,350 8,572 9,234 14,375 17,552  21,644 27,092  38,669 47,527 
Hungary  569 2,107 3,424 5,585 7,095 11,304 13,282 17,981 20,746 23,381  23,015 27,698  38,028 47,809 
Poland  109 425 1,370 2,307 3,789 7,843 11,463 14,587 22,479 26,075  34,227 41,247  47,900 60,5001) 
Slovakia  . . . . 897 1,297 2,046 2,083 2,890 3,188  4,746 5,582  8,530 11,2501) 
Slovenia  . . . 954 1,326 1,763 1,998 2,207 2,777 2,682  2,893 2,605  4,081 5,0001) 
      Total CEE-5  750 3,127 7,683 12,270 17,654 29,557 37,361 46,092 63,267 72,878  86,525 104,224  137,208 172,086 
                               
Estonia  . . 90 239 495 737 838 1,148 1,822 2,467  2,645 3,160  4,226 6,511 
Latvia  . . 43 75 309 615 936 1,272 1,558 1,795  2,084 2,332  2,751 3,320 
Lithuania  . . 20 153 310 352 700 1,041 1,625 2,063  2,334 2,665  3,981 4,960 
   Baltic countries  . . 153 466 1,114 1,704 2,475 3,460 5,004 6,326  7,063 8,157  10,959 14,791 
                               
Albania  . . 20 88 141 211 301 349 394 435  578 786  929 1,107 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  . . . . . . . . 67 244  390 509  774 1,155 
Bulgaria  4 60 101 141 247 337 446 951 1,597 2,403  2,257 2,758  3,662 5,0001) 
Croatia  . . . 120 237 351 862 1,395 1,903 2,578  3,560 4,706  6,711 11,351 
Macedonia  . . . . 24 33 45 75 203 235  410 851  929 1,024 
Romania  . 45 122 216 402 821 1,097 2,352 4,418 5,469  6,480 7,638  9,022 12,764 
Serbia and Montenegro  . . . . . . . 740 853 965  1,015 1,180  1,655 2,915 
   South Eastern Europe  4 105 243 565 1,052 1,755 2,752 5,862 9,433 12,329  14,690 18,428  23,682 35,316 
                               
Belarus  . . . 18 28 43 154 506 709 1,153  1,306 1,397  1,646 1,897 
Moldova  . . . 14 29 94 117 196 258 323  459 600  727 789 
Russia  . . . 1,211 1,900 3,966 6,545 11,410 14,172 17,481  25,226 36,776  51,374 65,0001) 
Ukraine  . . . 370 529 796 1,317 1,940 2,683 3,179  3,875 4,801  5,529 7,5001) 
   European CIS  . . . 1,613 2,486 4,899 8,133 14,052 17,822 22,136  30,865 43,574  59,276 75,186 
 Asian CIS   . . 173 1,500 2,397 4,018 6,608 9,715 12,712 15,174  16,123 20,856  25,139 32,0001) 
      All CIS         3,113 4,883 8,917 14,741 23,767 30,534 37,310  46,988 64,430  84,415 107,186 
                               
Total  24,702 41,933 57,328 79,181 108,238 128,844  155,266 195,239  256,264 329,379 
1) Estimate.                               
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Annex Table 2: Documentation of data used in panel analysis 
Variable  Growth  Investment/GDP  ?Investment/GDP  Inflation  Crisis 
Definition  Per-capita  Gross fixed capital  Change in  consumer  Dummy for 
  GDP growth  formation in % of  Investment/GDP  price inflation  financial 
    GDP  ratio    crisis/armed 
          conflict 
Source  World Bank  IMF WEO  IMF WEO  IMF WEO  n.a. 
  WDI         
Variable  FDI/GDP  Finance  Infrastructure  Invclim  Service 
Definition  Stock of FDI  Average of EBRD  Average of EBRD  Average of EBRD  Average of  Invclim 
  as % of GDP  reform indices on  reform indices on  reform indices on  and Infrastructure, 
    banking and non-  infrastructure  privatisation and  see Annex 1 
    banking financial  (telecom, rail, road,  liberalisation, see  for details 
    sector, see Annex  water, power), see  Annex 1 for   
    1 for details  Annex 1 for  details   
      details     
Source  WIIW*  EBRD Transition  EBRD Transition  EBRD Transition  EBRD Transition 
    Report  Report  Report  Report 
Sample  Albania  Croatia  Kazakhstan  Moldova  Slovenia 
countries  Armenia  Czech Republic  Kyrgyz Republic  Poland  Tajikistan 
  Azerbaijan  Estonia  Latvia  Romania  Ukraine 
  Belarus  Georgia  Lithuania  Russia  Uzbekistan 
  Bulgaria  Hungary  Macedonia  Slovak Republic   
Notes:* Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche 
 
Annex Table 3: Descriptive statistics of panel dataset 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
growth  349  0.1  9.4  -44.7  16.2 
investment/GDP  358  21.2  7.2  0.9  56.5 
?investment/GDP  334  -0.3  5.3  -47.2  21.8 
inflation  351  240.4  996.9  -8.6  15606.5 
crisis  360  0.1  0.3  0.0  1.0 
FDI/GDP  203  15.6  14.2  0.0  71.7 
Finance  360  2.0  0.8  1.0  3.8 
Infrastructure  360  1.8  0.8  1.0  3.7 
Service  360  1.9  0.7  1.0  3.8 
Invclim  360  2.7  0.9  1.0  3.9 
Note: For definition of variables see Annex Table 2. 
Annex Table 4: Pair-wise correlation coefficients of variables used in panel analysis 
Variable  No.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
growth  1  1                   
investment/GDP  2  0.10  1                 
?investment/GDP  3  0.30  0.35  1               
inflation  4  -0.30  -0.13  -0.05  1             
crisis  5  -0.42  -0.03  -0.17  0.20  1           
FDI/GDP  6  0.35  0.31  -0.01  -0.24  -0.12  1         
Finance  7  0.51  0.16  0.17  -0.27  -0.32  0.72  1       
Infrastructure  8  0.48  0.14  0.15  -0.23  -0.26  0.78  0.88  1     
Service  9  0.59  0.03  0.23  -0.28  -0.31  0.68  0.89  0.82  1   
Invclim  10  0.51  0.16  0.16  -0.26  -0.30  0.78  0.97  0.97  0.88  1 
 